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Abstract—Embedded cryptographic devices are vulnerable to
power analysis attacks. Threshold Implementations provide prov-
able security against first-order power analysis attacks for hard-
ware and software implementations. Like masking, the approach
relies on secret sharing but it differs in the implementation of
logic functions. While masking can fail to provide protection due
to glitches in the circuit, Threshold Implementations rely on few
assumptions about the hardware and are fully compatible with
standard design flows. We investigate two important properties
of Threshold Implementations in detail and point out interesting
trade-offs between circuit area and randomness requirements.
We propose two new Threshold Implementations of AES that,
starting from a common previously published implementation,
illustrate possible trade-offs. We provide concrete ASIC imple-
mentation results for all three designs using the same library,
and we evaluate the practical security of all three designs on the
same FPGA platform. Our analysis allows us to directly compare
the security provided by the different trade-offs, and to quantify
the associated hardware cost.
Keywords—Threshold Implementation, First-order DPA, Higher-
order DPA, Glitches, Sharing, AES, S-box
I. INTRODUCTION
An increasing number of embedded devices implement some
security functionality, for instance smart cards (banking, SIM,
public transport, access control, passports), car keys, set-top
boxes (pay TV), media players, mobile phones, tablets, medi-
cal implants, etc. These devices use cryptographic algorithms
that are secure against mathematical cryptanalysis. This means
that a system’s security relies on the secrecy of a so-called
cryptographic key, and that there are no mathematical short-
cuts that allow to break the system. However, in the late 90s
the security of such devices has been shown to depend also on
the algorithms’ implementation [1]. During the computation
of an algorithm the device leaks information, for instance
through its power consumption, electromagnetic emanations,
etc. Side channel attacks (SCA) can reveal the key from these
leakages and are often inexpensive, hence they are among
the most relevant threats for the security of implementations
of cryptographic algorithms. Certain countermeasures against
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SCA aim to introduce noise in the side channel, e.g. random
delays, random order execution, dummy operations, etc., while
masking conceals all sensitive intermediate values of a com-
putation with random data. Different masking schemes, like
additive [2], [3] and multiplicative [4], have been proposed in
order to provide security against differential power analysis
(DPA) attacks. In dth-order additive masking, each sensitive
intermediate value x of the algorithm is represented and
processed in d + 1 shares x1, . . . , xd, xd+1 where the first d
shares are chosen at random and the last share is chosen such
that x1 ⊕ . . . xd ⊕ xd+1 = x. Masking allows one to formally
argue the security it provides against DPA.
However, it was shown [5]–[7] that masked hardware imple-
mentations can still be vulnerable to first-order DPA due to the
presence of glitches. One can try to eliminate the security rel-
evant glitches by carefully balancing signal propagation delays
or by using special “secure” logic styles, but this is not always
compatible with standard design flows, is poorly supported by
standard tools, requires expertise, time, iterations of design
and testing, and hence is expensive. As an alternative, new
masking schemes have been developed that provide provable
security for a circuit generated with a standard design flow
even if glitches occur in the circuit.
Related Work: In 2006 Nikova et al. proposed such a
scheme called Threshold Implementation (TI) [8]. It is based
on secret-sharing and provides provable security against first-
order DPA [9]. In 2011 Prouff and Roche proposed a dth-order
masking scheme [10], based on Shamir’s secret sharing, for
which they claim security even against higher-order attacks. It
is a general method that replaces every field multiplication by
4d3 field multiplications and 4d3 additions, using 2d2 bytes of
randomness. For resource constrained embedded applications
this may prove too costly or inefficient. Moreover, it has been
shown in [11] that straightforward implementations of this
scheme may not be secure in practice.
The TI technique is based on a specific type of multi-
party computation and applies Boolean masking. Interesting
properties of the technique are that it provides provable se-
curity against first-order side-channel attacks, that it requires
few assumptions on the hardware leakage behavior, that it is
fully compatible with standard CMOS and FPGA design flows,
and that it allows to construct realistic-size circuits without
intervention and design iterations. However, TIs can still be
broken by univariate mutual information analysis (MIA) [9],
[12] or univariate higher-order attacks [13].
It has been shown that all 3 × 3 and 4 × 4 S-boxes have
a TI sharing with 3, 4 or 5 shares [14]. The TI approach has
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2been applied to only a few entire algorithms: PRESENT [15],
AES [16], [17], KECCAK [18] and Fides [19]. In AES, the
S-box is by far the most challenging part to share. Moradi
et al. [16] proposed a TI of this S-box, based on the tower
field approach [20], that constantly uses three shares. They
also use three shares for the AES implementation. In contrast,
Bilgin et al. [17] proposed to change the number of shares for
different stages of the tower field approach, and for the AES
implementation.
Contribution: This paper is an extended version of our
paper at AfricaCrypt 2014 [17]. We proposed a TI of AES-128
encryption that requires about 9k GE with the library that we
use and 44 bits of additional randomness per S-box calculation.
We used the tower field approach over GF(24) for the S-box
and we adapted the number of shares for each function in
the S-box computation to minimize the overall gate count of
the S-box. We used only two shares for most of the linear
operations and hence had two sets of registers for state update
and key schedule. All functions were uniformly shared and
the number of shares went up to five in the S-box. We used
re-masking to satisfy the uniformity in the whole circuit when
the uniformly shared functions are combined. Our practical
security evaluation confirmed the expected first-order DPA
resistance and identified the linear part in two shares as the
most vulnerable part of the implementation.
In this extended version, we investigate the uniformity
problem and the need for re-masking in more detail. We
prove that under certain circumstances, it is enough to re-
mask only a fraction of the shares. Moreover, we argue that
if there is enough re-masking, we do not need to share func-
tions uniformly. This observation helps us to further reduce
the area and randomness requirements. We provide two new
implementations. The first one is similar to the one in [17],
but it uses at least three shares in all the operations, including
the linear ones. We use it to investigate the increase in security
when moving from at least two to at least three shares, and
to quantify the associated cost. The second implementation
is based on the one in [17] but modified according to our
findings regarding uniformity and re-masking. It requires only
about 8k GE with the library that we use and 32 bits of
additional randomness per S-box calculation. Our three imple-
mentations need the same number of clock cycles to complete
the calculation, and allow us therefore to focus on some trade-
offs between area and additional randomness. Moreover, we
provide results of practical security evaluations of all three
implementations on the same FPGA platform and under the
same lab conditions. They confirm the theoretically guaranteed
first-order attack resistance for all implementations and allow
us to complement the study of trade-offs with an analysis of
our implementations’ security against higher-order attacks.
II. THRESHOLD IMPLEMENTATIONS
We recall and clarify the definitions and security theorems
of Threshold Implementations.
A. Notation and Definitions
Lower-case characters refer to elements of a finite field and
functions over finite fields, while upper-case characters are
used for stochastic variables. We denote a vector or a vector
function with bold characters. Let X ∈ Fm denote the input
of the (unshared) function f . A masking (share vector) X of
X is the result of a stochastic function that takes as inputs a
value x and some auxiliary values (random masks), and that
outputs a vector x containing shares x1, x2, . . . , xsx such that
the XOR-sum of the sx shares equals x. For all values x with
Pr(X = x) > 0, let Sh(x) denote the set of valid share vectors
x for x:
Sh(x) = {x ∈ Fmsx |x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xsx = x} .
Pr(X = x|X = x) denotes the probability that X = x when
the unshared input of the masking equals x, taken over all
auxiliary inputs of the masking. Similarly, we denote the output
Y ∈ Fn, and corresponding sy,y and Sh(y). Let f denote
the vector function composed of the component functions
f1, . . . , fsy operating on the share vector x and outputting y;
we will call it a sharing of the function.
The scheme, like most other masking schemes, requires that
the masking is uniform, in the sense of the following definition.
Definition 1 (Uniform masking): A masking X is uniform
if and only if there exists a constant p such that for all x we
have:
if x ∈ Sh(x) then Pr(X = x|X = x) = p,
else Pr(X = x|X = x) = 0
and ∑
x∈Sh(x)
Pr(X = x) = Pr(X = x) .
In words, we call a masking uniform if for each value x of
the variable X , the corresponding vectors with masked values
occur with the same probability.
Threshold Implementations use sharings that satisfy cor-
rectness and non-completeness properties which are defined
as follows.
Definition 2 (Correctness): The sharing f is correct if and
only if ∀x ∈ Fm, ∀y ∈ Fn:
∀x ∈ Sh(x),∀y ∈ Sh(y); f(x) = y⇔ f(x) = y.
Definition 3 (Non-completeness): A sharing f is non-
complete if every component function of f is independent of
at least one share xi of x.
B. Security Proofs
We start with a lemma proving that uniformity of a masking
implies the independence that we need for the proof of
Theorem 1. Let Xi¯ denote the vector obtained by removing
Xi from X.
Lemma 1: If the masking X of X is uniform, then Xi¯ and
X are independent (for any choice of i).
Proof: Two stochastic functions are independent if and
only if their joint distribution equals the product of their
marginal distributions. Hence, we have to show for all i that
∀xi¯, x : Pr(X = x,Xi¯ = xi¯) = Pr(Xi¯ = xi¯) Pr(X = x).
3Since Pr(A,B) = Pr(B) Pr(A|B), it suffices to show that
∀xi¯, x : Pr(Xi¯ = xi¯|X = x) = Pr(Xi¯ = xi¯). We start from
Pr(X = x|X = x) = Pr(Xi¯ = xi¯, Xi = xi|X = x)
=
Pr(X = x,Xi¯ = xi¯, Xi = xi)
Pr(X = x)
=
Pr(X = x,Xi¯ = xi¯, Xi = xi)
Pr(X = x,Xi¯ = xi¯)
Pr(X = x,Xi¯ = xi¯)
Pr(X = x)
= Pr(Xi¯ = xi¯|X = x) Pr(Xi = xi|X = x,Xi¯ = xi¯) .
We know that the last factor equals 1 when x ∈ Sh(x) and
zero otherwise. Hence we obtain
∀x : Pr(Xi¯ = xi¯|X = x) = p. (1)
Now we can write (Bayes’ Theorem):
Pr(Xi¯ = xi¯) =
∑
x
Pr(Xi¯ = xi¯|X = x) Pr(X = x)
= p
∑
x
Pr(X = x) = p. (2)
The equality of Eqs. (1) and (2) proves the claim.
It follows that p = |F|m(1−sx).
The security against first-order side-channel attacks in cir-
cuits satisfying correctness and non-completeness follows now
from two intuitively easy steps. We start from a result on the
individual component functions.
Theorem 1 ( [9]): If the masking X is uniform and the
shared function f (hence the circuit of f ) is non-complete,
then any single component function of f does not leak any
information on X .
The proof of this theorem is simple and intuitive (see [9] for the
formal proof). Every component function works on an input Xi¯
for some i. Lemma 1 states that such an input is independent
of X . In other words, a component function does not get the
information to determine the value of X . Since the function
does not know x, it cannot leak x. Note that we do not have to
make any assumption on the physical behavior of the hardware
or software implementation of the component functions.
Finally, we look at the whole circuit. Even though the
component functions of f can be made independent of X indi-
vidually, we cannot achieve independence for the whole circuit.
However, due to the linearity of the expectation operator, we
can still prove independence of the average value and therefore
resistance against first-order attacks. Let L denote a leakage
signal of an implementation of the circuit f , be it instantaneous
or summed over an arbitrary period of time. We require that
the leakage of the whole circuit is the sum of the leakages of
the sub-circuits.
Theorem 2 ( [9]): If the masking X is uniform and the
circuit of f is non-complete, then the expected value (average)
of L is constant.
The proof uses only elementary probability theory. Due to
the linearity of the expectation operator, the expected value
of L is the sum of the expected values of the leakages of
the component functions. Theorem 1 implies that the expected
values of the leakages of the component functions are constant.
Hence, so is the expected value of L.
Note that the only required assumption on the physical
behavior of the hardware or software implementation of f is
that the component functions can be implemented such that the
leakage from each of them is independent of at least one share
of X . In other words, the cross-talk between implementations
of different components should be negligible. However, the
theorem claims results only on the expected value of L, since
higher-order statistical moments are not linear.
C. What Can Go Wrong without Uniformity?
We show by means of a simple example what can go
wrong if a sharing is not uniform. Note that the non-uniform
sharing of the 5× 5 S-box of the SHA-3 competition winner
Keccak [18], [21] has similar problems. Let (A,B) ∈ F22 and
their product F2 3 C = f(A,B) = AB. Define f as follows:
C1 = f1(A2, A3, B2, B3) = A2B2 +A2B3 +A3B2
C2 = f2(A1, A3, B1, B3) = A3B3 +A1B3 +A3B1 (3)
C3 = f3(A1, A2, B1, B2) = A1B1 +A1B2 +A2B1 .
If the masking of the input (A,B) is uniform, then the masking
of C is distributed as shown in Table I. In order to satisfy the
uniformity of the masking of the output C, we would need that
the 16 non-zero values in the table were equal (specifically
to 22(3−1)−1(3−1) = 4 as will be defined in Definition 4).
Theorem 2 implies that there is no leakage of information in
this circuit. However, if C is used as input of a second circuit,
then Theorem 2 does not apply anymore to the second circuit
(because its inputs are not uniform) and potentially the second
circuit might leak information.
Table I: Number of times that a masking c1, c2, c3 occurs for
a given input (a, b).
c1, c2, c3
(a, b) 000 011 101 110 001 010 100 111
(0, 0) 7 3 3 3 0 0 0 0
(0, 1) 7 3 3 3 0 0 0 0
(1, 0) 7 3 3 3 0 0 0 0
(1, 1) 0 0 0 0 5 5 5 1
Let E = D×C and let this multiplication be implemented
by similar formulas as above. For example, Eq. (3) becomes:
E1 = f1(C2, C3, D2, D3) = C2D2 + C2D3 + C3D2 . (4)
Assume that the masking of D is uniform but the masking
of C has the distribution given in Table I. Then the masking
of E will be distributed as shown in Table II. The average
Hamming weight of E1, E2, E3 in the seventh row ((a, b, d) =
(1, 1, 0)) equals 33/32, whereas it equals 27/32 in the first six
rows. This implies that some hardware implementations might
show a different average power consumption when (a, b, d) =
(1, 1, 0). Observe also that the correlation between Ci and C is
0.125. Hence, in the part of the circuit implementing Eq. (4),
the average of the leakage L can be correlated to C, since both
C2 and C3 are correlated to C.
4Table II: Number of times that a masking e1, e2, e3 occurs for
a given input (a, b, d).
e1, e2, e3
(a, b, d) 000 011 101 110 001 010 100 111
(0, 0, 0) 37 9 9 9 0 0 0 0
(0, 0, 1) 37 9 9 9 0 0 0 0
(0, 1, 0) 37 9 9 9 0 0 0 0
(0, 1, 1) 37 9 9 9 0 0 0 0
(1, 0, 0) 37 9 9 9 0 0 0 0
(1, 0, 1) 37 9 9 9 0 0 0 0
(1, 1, 0) 31 11 11 11 0 0 0 0
(1, 1, 1) 0 0 0 0 21 21 21 1
D. Uniformity as a Remedy
We can take different types of actions to remedy the problem
described in the previous section. First, we can apply re-
masking as done by Moradi et al. [16]: by adding fresh masks
to the shares C1, C2, C3, we make the distribution uniform. A
discussion on re-masking is provided in Section II-F. Second,
we can impose an extra condition on f such that the distribution
of its output is always uniform. This extra condition is the
uniformity defined below.
Definition 4 (Uniform sharing of a function (circuit)): The
sharing f is uniform if and only if
∀x ∈ Fm,∀y ∈ Fn with f(x) = y,∀y ∈ Sh(y) :
|{x ∈ Sh(x)|f(x) = y}| = |F|
m(sx−1)
|F|n(sy−1) .
If sx = sy and m = n, this simplifies to:
∀x, y ∈ Fm with f(x) = y,∀y ∈ Sh(y) :
|{x ∈ Sh(x)|f(x) = y}| = 1 .
It follows that a uniform circuit f is invertible if and only if f
is invertible. We now prove that the uniform circuit condition
is sufficient to achieve a uniform distribution at its output.
Theorem 3: If the masking X is uniform and the circuit f
is uniform, then the masking Y of Y = f(X), defined by
Y = f(X) is uniform.
Proof: In order to prove that Y is uniform, we need to
show that Pr(Y = y|Y = y) is equal to a constant p if y ∈
Sh(y) and 0 otherwise by Definition 1. Considering y = f(x)
and y = f(x), we obtain:
Pr(Y = y|Y = y)
=
∑
x∈Sh(x),
x,f(x)=y
Pr(Y = f(x)|Y = f(x)) Pr(X = x, X = x).
Using the equality
Pr(X = x, X = x) = Pr(X = x|X = x) Pr(X = x)
and Definition 1, the second factor becomes p′ Pr(X = x).
The proof of Lemma 1 implies that p′ = |F|−m(sx−1). Defini-
tion 4 implies that the first factor equals |F|m(sx−1)−n(sy−1)
for all y ∈ Sh(y). We obtain
Pr(Y = y|Y = y)
=
∑
x∈Sh(x),
x,f(x)=y
|F|−n(sy−1) Pr(X = x) = |F|−n(sy−1).
Hence, Pr(Y = y|Y = y) is equal to a constant p =
|F|−n(sy−1) if y ∈ Sh(y) and 0 otherwise satisfying a uniform
masking.
Practice shows that adding the uniformity requirement to a
non-completely shared function tends to blow up its mathe-
matical complexity, as well as the cost of its implementation.
In some applications it might be better to consider re-masking,
for instance if random bits are available at low cost.
E. Uniformity for Cascaded and Parallel Functions
If the TI technique is used to protect cascaded functions,
then extra measures like the ones discussed in the previous
section need to be taken, such that the input for the following
nonlinear operation is again a uniform masking. A similar
situation occurs when the TI technique is used to protect
several functional blocks acting in parallel on (partially) the
same inputs. This occurs for example in implementations of
the AES S-box using the tower field approach. If no special
care is taken, then “local uniformity” of the distributions of
the outputs of the individual blocks will not lead to “global
uniformity” for the joint distributions of the outputs of all
blocks. For example, let f ,g be two functions acting on the
same uniform input x. Then, even if f ,g are uniform shared
functions, producing uniform y = f(x) and y′ = g(x), this
does not imply that (y,y′) is uniform. Like with cascaded
functions, if each of the parallel blocks satisfies the properties
of correctness and non-completeness, there will be no leakage
of signals within the parallel blocks, but the lack of uniformity
in the joint distribution of the output’s masking can lead to
information leakage if the outputs are combined as inputs to
a following nonlinear function. At this time, the only known
solution for this problem is re-masking.
F. Reducing the Randomness Used in a Re-masking Step
As mentioned in the beginning of Section II-D, we can
generate a uniform masking from any share vector X by re-
masking all its shares Xi using fresh random masks. Hence,
we stress the following point.
Observation 1: A TI that uses re-masking does not need
uniformly shared functions in order to resist first-order attacks.
However, re-masking all the shares of a masking can be
a burden when generating fresh randomness is costly. The
following theorem allows to reduce the amount of random bits
used by re-masking steps of TIs: if (X1, . . . , Xt) of a masking
with s shares have a uniform distribution, only the remaining
nonuniform fraction of the shares (Xt+1, . . . , Xs) needs to be
re-masked.
Theorem 4: Let (X1, X2, . . . , Xs) be a masking of a
(stochastic) variable X ∈ Fm, where Pr(X1 = x1, . . . , Xt =
xt) = |F|−tm,∀(x1, . . . , xt) for some t with 1 ≤ t ≤ s.
5Then the masking (Y1, . . . , Ys), defined by Yi = Xi for
1 ≤ i ≤ t and Yi = Xi + Ri for t < i ≤ s, is a
uniform masking of X , i.e.: Pr(Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2, . . . , Ys =
ys|X = y1 + y2 + · · · ys) = |F|m(1−s), provided that the Ri,
i = t+1, . . . , s−1 are independently and uniformly distributed
random variables and that Rs = −(Rt+1 + · · ·+Rs−1).
Proof: We give here a sketch of the proof. We have:
Pr(Y1 = y1, . . . , Ys = ys|X = y1 + y2 + · · · ys)
= Pr(Y1 = y1, . . . , Yt = yt|X = y1 + y2 + · · · ys) (5)
·Pr(Yt+1 = yt+1, . . . , Ys = ys ←↩
↪→ |X = y1 + · · · ys, Y1 = y1, . . . , Yt = yt) .
Since Yi = Xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ t, the first factor equals |F|−tm.
For the second factor we recall the definition of Yt+1 to obtain
that:
Pr(Yt+1 = yt+1)
=
∑
xt+1
Pr(Xt+1 = xt+1) Pr(Rt+1 = yt+1 − xt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
|F|−m
.
The same holds for Yt+2, . . . , Ys−1 and since the Ri have
independent distributions, we can equate the second factor of
(5) to:
|F|(1−s−t)m∑xt+1,...,xs−1 Pr(Xt+1=xt+1,...,Xs−1=xs−1,Ys=ys|←↩
↪→X=y1+···+ys,X1=x1,...,Xt=xt) .
Recalling the definition of Ys completes the proof.
Clearly, the extra randomness required by the re-masking
approach in some cases may be a worse problem than the
blow-up in gate count caused by the uniform sharing approach.
G. Consequences
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 can be proven using Definitions 1
and 3. Moreover Definition 3 is required only for the sake
of the implementation’s correctness. In contrast, if several
circuits are cascaded (pipelined) or they run in parallel, the
uniform sharing in Definition 4 is also needed in order to
satisfy Definition 1 in the following circuit. However, using
a uniform circuit can be avoided with (partial) re-masking. In
other words, if we consider first-order DPA only, then there
is no need to demand uniformity of a sharing that is followed
by a re-masking step anyway. By relinquishing the uniformity
requirement, it is often possible to reduce the number of shares
and the size of the circuit as suggested in Theorem 4. This will
be used in the next section in order to reduce the number of
shares in the subcircuits of the AES S-box.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we will discuss three different TIs of AES
which we refer to as raw, adjusted and nimble implementa-
tions. All implementations share the same data flow and tim-
ing. The implementations differ mostly in the S-box calculation
and/or the number of shares that are used in different blocks
of the algorithm. The raw implementation is from our paper
at AfricaCrypt 2014 [17] and forms the basis of the other
two implementations. Hence, we will mainly describe the raw
implementation and point out the differences with the other
two. The main feature of the raw implementation is that it
uses the smallest possible number of shares for each function,
except the linear transformations in the S-box, provided that
the shared functions are uniform. In other words, all nonlinear
operations are performed with n > 2 shares such that the
circuits are uniform and n is as small as possible. The linear
operations outside the S-box are performed with two shares,
whereas the linear operations in the S-box use two, three or
four shares (see Sect. III-B).
The adjusted implementation on the other hand ensures that
at least three shares are used in every operation, including the
linear ones. With this implementation we intend to observe
the effect of moving from at least two shares to at least three
shares in linear operations on the resistance against higher-
order DPA, and to quantify the associated cost. In the nimble
implementation the number of shares is always minimal, i.e.
n = d+1 where d is the degree of the unshared function, even
if the resulting shared function is not uniform. The uniformity
of the circuit is satisfied by re-masking.
We will first describe the general data flow of our imple-
mentations in Section III-A. In Section III-B we will introduce
different approaches to apply the TI to the AES S-box, which is
the only nonlinear layer of the block cipher. We described the
proposed designs in Verilog, separating component functions
in modules, and verified their functionality with ModelSim.
Then we used a standard tool chain to synthesize them using
Synopsys Design Vision D-201-.03-SP4 with Faraday Standard
Cell Library FSA0A C Generic Core, which is based on
UMC 0.18µm GenericII Logic Process with 1.8V voltage.
We will conclude this section by providing the area, timing
and randomness requirements of our designs in Section III-C.
We look at the number of NAND gate equivalence (GE)
for the area, represent the timing with clock cycles and
calculate the randomness requirement in bits. We compare our
implementations with the previous work in [16] which uses
a similar standard cell library based on UMC 0.18µm logic
process with 1.8V voltage.
A. General Data Flow
We use a serial implementation for round operations and key
schedule as proposed in [16], [17] which requires only one S-
box instance and loads the plaintext and key byte-wise in row-
wise order. We also use one MixColumns instance that operates
on the whole column and provides an output in one clock cycle.
Due to this extreme serialization, one round requires at least
21 clock cycles even for the unprotected implementation [16].
All our TIs execute one round in 23 clock cycles. In the first
16 clock cycles, the plaintext is XORed with the key and sent
to the S-box. Its output will be taken from the 3rd to the 18th
clock cycles and stored in the state registers, i.e. the S-box
is executed in three clock cycles. The ShiftRows operation is
performed in the 19th clock cycle followed by four cycles of
MixColumns calculation. The S-box takes its input from the
key schedule for four cycles starting from the 18th cycle. In the
17th, 22nd and 23rd clock cycles, the S-box inputs and unused
6random bits are set to 0. Therefore, the calculation of AES
takes 23× 10 + 16 = 246 clock cycles, including 16 cycles to
output the ciphertext.
1) Raw implementation: We use two sets of state registers,
each consisting of sixteen 16-bit registers, corresponding to the
two shares of the state. The MixColumns and the Key XOR
operations are also performed with two shares. This can be
seen in Fig. 1, as the key and the state registers are 256 bits
implying the two shares.
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Figure 1: Architecture of the serialized TI of raw AES-128.
This TI of the S-box (details will be given in the following
section) requires four input shares, therefore we initially share
the plaintext in four shares. We share the key in two shares
and XOR them with two of the plaintext shares before the S-
box operation. More details about the key scheduling will be
given later in this section. Besides the shared input, the S-box
needs 20-bits of randomness r. The first two output shares
sbout1,2 are written to the state register S33 (Fig. 2) whereas
the remaining share sbout3 is written to register P3. The data
in the state registers are shifted to the left for the following 16
cycles so that the next output of the S-box can be stored in the
same registers. During this shift, the data in P3 (pout in Fig. 1)
is XORed with the second share of the S-box output, which is
in the state register S33, to reduce the number of shares from
three to two. To achieve this signal sig2 is active from the 4
th
to the 19th clock cycle.
The ShiftRows operation is performed in the 19th clock cycle
with an irregular horizontal shift. In the next four clock-cycles,
the data in the registers S00, S10, S20 and S30 are sent to the
MixColumns operation, the rest of the registers are shifted
to the left horizontally and the output of the MixColumns
operation is written to the registers S03, S13, S23 and S33. The
MixColumns operation is implemented column-wise as in [16]
and with two shares working in parallel. The registers except
S10, S11 and S12 are implemented as scan flip-flops (SFF) that
are D-flip-flops (DFF) combined with 2-to-1 MUXes. They
can operate with two inputs at reduced area cost. A single 2-
to-1 MUX costs 3.33 GE and one bit register costs 5.33 GE
whereas one bit SFF costs 6.33 GE in our library.
In the following AES rounds, we increase the number of
shares of the S-box input from two to four, using 24 bits of
randomness (three bytes each of which is referred to as mi
sbin1,2
sbin3,4
||m1
P
mi m2||m3sig1
sig2 mcini
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S00
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Figure 2: Architecture of the state (top) and key (bottom)
arrays for our raw implementation where Si, Ki and P0 hold
two shares and P3 holds one share. The registers P0 and P3 are
used by the state and the key array. The XOR of the value in
P3 and S33 (resp. K30) is on one share of the value in register
S33 (resp. K30) whereas all the other combinational operations
are on two shares.
in the figures), one clock cycle before the S-box operation. To
achieve this signal sig1 is active for sixteen clock cycles, start-
ing from the last clock-cycle of each round. We separate the
increase of the number of shares and the nonlinear operation
with registers to achieve the non-completeness property. The
two additional shares are stored in P0. The two shares in S00
are XORed with the two shares of the corresponding round
key byte and sent to the S-box together with the two shares in
P0.
The registers P0 and P3 are used for both the round
transformations and the key scheduling.
Similar to the state array, the key array also consists of
sixteen 16-bit registers, implemented as SFFs, each corre-
sponding to the two shares of a byte in the key schedule.
The round key is inserted from the register K33 in the first
sixteen clock cycles of each round. For the next three clock
cycles, the registers except the last column (K03, K13, K23
and K33) are not clocked. The registers K03, K23 and K33 are
also not clocked in the 17th clock cycle. In that clock cycle,
we increase the number of shares in the register K13. In the
7following three clock cycles this re-sharing is done during the
vertical shift from the register K23 to K13, i.e. the re-sharing
signal sig4 is active from the 17th to the 20th clock cycle.
Signal sig5 is active from the 18th to the 21st clock cycle to
reduce the number of shares back to two. The registers K03,
K13, K23 and K33 are not clocked in the remaining two clock
cycles of each round. We choose this way of irregular clocking
to avoid using extra MUXes in our design. Two shares of the
S-box output are XORed to the data in K00 in the last four
clock cycles of each round. In the 20th clock cycle the round
counter rcon is additionally XORed to one of these shares.
The number of shares is reduced back to two by XORing the
share in P3 to one of the shares in K30. Signal sig3 is active in
the first sixteen clock cycles except the 4th, 8th, 12th and 16th
clock cycles. The round key is taken from the register K00 to
be XORed with the corresponding plaintext before going to
the S-box operation.
2) Adjusted implementation: This version works on three
shares for both the state and the key schedule which increases
the area significantly. The S-box still requires four input shares
and outputs three shares, hence the register P0 is reduced to
8-bits (one share) and the register P3 is not required. Similar
to the raw implementation, we use 24-bits of randomness to
increase the number of shares from three to four one cycle
before the S-box, i.e. each of the existing three shares is
XORed with a random byte and the sum of these random bytes
is taken as the fourth share. This also ensures uniformity of
the S-box input. Together with the state, the number of shares
for MixColumns and Key XOR increases to three.
3) Nimble implementation: Similar to the raw implemen-
tation, this one also uses two shares for the state and key
arrays. The main difference is that the S-box needs three input
shares instead of four. Hence the size of the register P0 is
reduced to 8-bits (one share). As a result, we need only 16-
bits of randomness to increase the number of shares from two
to three before the S-box operation, i.e. each share is XORed
with one byte of randomness and the XOR of the random bytes
is taken as the third share. The S-box requires 16-bits of extra
randomness per iteration and outputs three shares. Hence the
logic of the register P3 to reduce the number of shares back
to two stays the same.
B. TI of the AES S-box
The S-box implementations in [16] use the tower field
approach up to GF(22) for a small implementation. Therefore,
the only nonlinear operation is GF(22) multiplication which
must be followed by registers and re-masking to avoid first
order leakages.
We also chose to use the tower field approach, however,
we decided to go until GF(24) instead of GF(22). With this
approach, the GF(24) inverter (algebraic normal form provided
in Appendix B) can be seen as a four bit permutation and
the GF(24) multiplier (algebraic normal form provided in
Appendix A) as a four bit multiplication both of which are well
studied in [22]. Therefore, we can find uniform TIs for each
of these nonlinear functions. This might allow us to reduce the
number of fresh random bits needed since we will have fewer
nonlinear blocks compared to [22] hence possibly require less
re-masking in order to use their outputs. Moreover, with this
approach the S-box calculation takes three clock cycles instead
of five.
1) Raw implementation (Fig. 3): The uniformity of each
function is individually satisfied. The uniform sharing with
four input and three output shares that is used to share each
term in the multiplication is provided in Appendix C. For
the inversion, which belongs to class C4282 [14], we consider
two options. Either using four shares, which is the minimum
number of shares necessary for a uniform implementation in
that class, and decomposing the function into three uniform
sub-functions as Inv(x) = F (G(H(x))), or using five shares
without any decomposition. Our experiments show that both
versions have similar area requirements but need a different
number of clock cycles. To reduce the number of cycles, we
chose the version with five shares, generated by applying the
formula in Appendix F to each term of the inversion. This
sharing is found by using the method described in [9] which
is slightly different from the direct sharing [14]. We chose
this sharing since it can be implemented in hardware with less
logic gates compared to the direct sharing.
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Figure 3: The S-box of the raw implementation.
Even though it is enough to use only two shares for linear
operations, we sometimes chose to work on more than two
shares to avoid the need of extra random bits. The linear map
of the tower-field S-box operates on four shares since the
multiplication needs four input shares. The inverter requires
five input shares and the multiplication outputs only three
shares, therefore we use two shares for the square scalar to
have five shares in the beginning of the 2nd phase. We use
three shares for the inverse linear map of the tower-field S-box
since the multiplication outputs three shares. For all the linear
operations, the shared functions are created as instantiations
of the unshared function for the first share and as unshared
function without the constant term for the other shares.
During the combination of these uniform circuits, we face
the challenges described in Section II-E to keep the uniformity
in the pipeline registers. We apply re-masking on the first
pipeline register where we combine the two output shares of
the square scaler and the three output shares of the multiplier
to generate five shares. Note that this combination also acts as
the XOR of the outputs of the square scaler and the multiplier.
By Theorem 4, it is enough to re-mask only the output shares
of one of the functions to achieve uniformity. We choose to
re-mask the output of the square scaler since it operates on less
shares, hence requires less random bits. The correction mask,
8i.e. the XOR of the masks, is XORed to one of the output
shares of the multiplier to achieve correctness.
An other challenge is to satisfy the uniformity of the circuit
as we increase or decrease the number of shares. This is
achieved by introducing new masks before the S-box operation
to increase from two to four shares and at the end of the 2nd
phase to decrease from five to four shares. The output of the
3rd phase is not uniform when the three shares are considered
together. However, we verified by simulation that each share
individually is uniform, which implies that there is no first-
order leakage in the following registers. We combine the first
two shares with an XOR and keep the third share as it is to
go back to two shares. We also verified that, after we decrease
the number of shares to two, the output shares are uniform.
We always keep the XOR of the masks in the pipeline
registers and complete the re-masking in the next clock cycle
as in [16]. Overall, we need 44 fresh random bits per S-box
operation including increasing the number of shares of the S-
box input.
2) Adjusted implementation (Fig. 4): As mentioned in the
earlier sections, the only difference between the raw and the
adjusted implementation is that the adjusted implementation
requires at least three shares for all the blocks including the
linear operations in the S-box. For that reason, the shared
square scaler circuit is instantiated with three shares. This S-
box also requires 44-bits of randomness per iteration.
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Figure 4: The S-box of the adjusted implementation.
3) Nimble implementation (Fig. 5): As can be observed
in Figs. 3 and 4, we use fresh randomness at the end of
the 1st phase to satisfy uniformity during the combination
of the square scaler’s and the multiplier’s outputs, and after
the inverter to break the dependency between the inputs of
the multipliers in the 3rd phase. Since these re-masking steps
conserve the uniformity property and the security of each block
is achieved only by the correctness and non-completeness
properties (Observation 1), we can discard the uniformity
property and implement these nonlinear functions with the
smallest number of shares n s.t. n > d, i.e. n = d+ 1, where
d is the degree of the unshared functions. We use the sharing
with three input and output shares provided in Appendix D
for each term of the multiplier and the sharing with four input
and output shares provided in Appendix E for each term of the
inverter. With this new construction, it is enough to have three
input shares to the S-box since the multiplier block requires
only three shares. We need to reduce the number of shares
from five to four at the end of the 1st phase for the inverter and
from four to three at the end of the 2nd phase for the following
multipliers. This construction requires only 32-bits of extra
randomness per S-box calculation, including increasing the
number of shares for the S-box input.
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Figure 5: The S-box of the nimble implementation.
C. Performance
Like any other DPA countermeasure, TI also allows trade-
offs between area, randomness and the resistance against DPA.
In Table III, we provide the area costs (GE) and randomness
requirements (bits) for the different S-box implementations.
For all the implementations, we performed two different com-
pilation methods. The first one is a regular compilation with the
compile command, that does not optimize or merge modules,
performed on the whole implementation. The second method
on the other hand uses the compile ultra command for each
module to let the tool optimize each of them individually and
combine the result. It is very important that the modules are
not merged for area optimization in this step, to not violate
the non-completeness property.
Table III: Synthesis results for different versions of S-box TI
with compile / compile ultra commands.
S-box Raw Adjusted Nimble
Lin.Map. 168 / 120 168 / 120 126 / 90
Sq.Sc. 18 27 18
Multiplier 625 / 458 625 / 458 418 / 308
Inverter 618 / 490 618 / 490 594 / 375
Inv.Lin.Map 99 / 72 99 / 72 99 / 72
1st Ph. 919 / 704 916 / 701 646 / 500
2nd Ph. 690 / 562 702 / 574 654 / 435
3rd Ph. 1374 / 1013 1374 / 1013 959 / 713
Registers* 725 661 576
Total 3708 / 3004 3653 / 2949 2835 / 2224
Random. 44 44 32
*: including the registers P0 and P3
The total area results in Table III show that using nonuni-
formly shared functions as in the nimble implementation
reduces the area cost significantly compared to the uniformly
shared raw and adjusted implementations. This reduction is
caused by the decreased number of shares used in the nonlinear
blocks. Moreover, the required number of random bits per S-
box also decreases together with the reduced number of shares
since less shares need to be re-masked to satisfy uniformity.
In Table IV, we show the area, randomness requirements
and timings of our AES implementations and compare them
with the results in [16]. We again provide our results using the
9same compilation techniques as the S-box implementations.
The area costs for the state and the key arrays include the
ANDs and XORs that are shown in Fig. 2. As expected in
the raw and nimble implementations the cost of the state and
key arrays together with the MixColumns are reduced by one
third compared to [16] and the adjusted implementation, since
we use two shares instead of three. All our versions have the
same timing and use the same control module.
Table IV: Synthesis results for different versions of AES TI
with compile / compile ultra commands.
Design [16] Raw Adjusted Nimble
State Ar. 2529 1698 2473 1687
Key Ar. 2526 1890 2762 1844
S-box 4244 3708 / 3004 3653 / 2949 2835 / 2224
MixCol. 1120 770 / 544 1156 / 816 770 / 544
Control1 255 242 242 242
Key XOR 64 48 72 48
MUXes 376 746 853 693
Total 11114 / 11031 9102 / 8172 11221 / 10167 8119 / 7282
Cycles 266 246 246 246
Random.2 48 44 44 32
1 including round constant and other 2 per S-box
In our implementations, the S-box occupies 30% to 40%
of the total area. Compared to the implementation in [16]
our S-boxes with uniform blocks are 13% smaller and our S-
box with non-uniform blocks is 33% smaller. These results
show a significant area and randomness improvement for
the nimble implementation, indicating that using nonuniform
shared functions can be advantageous if the uniformity of the
circuit is satisfied by re-masking.
IV. POWER ANALYSIS
To evaluate the security of our designs in practice we
implement them on a SASEBO-G board [23] using Xilinx
ISE version 10.1. The Verilog descriptions of the designs are
the same as for the ASIC evaluations, but we replaced all
SFFs by DFFs and MUXes because SFFs are not available. We
use the “keep hierarchy” constraint to prevent the tools from
optimizing over module boundaries (see the last paragraph of
Sect. II-B and the last sentence before Table III). Apart from
that we use the standard tool chain. The board features two
Xilinx Virtex-II Pro FPGA devices: we implement the TI AES
and a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) on the crypto
FPGA (xc2vp7) while the control FPGA (xc2vp30) handles
I/O with the measurement PC and other equipment. The PRNG
that generates all random bits is implemented as AES-128 in
CTR mode.
We measure the power consumption of the crypto FPGA
during the first 1.5 rounds of TI AES as the voltage drop over
a 1Ω resistor in the FPGA core GND line. The output of the
passive probe is sampled with a Tektronix DPO 7254C digital
oscilloscope at 1GS/s sampling rate.
A. Methodology
We define two main goals for our practical evaluations. First,
we want to verify our implementations’ resistance against first-
order attacks. But in practice adversaries are of course not
restricted to applying such attacks. Therefore, our second goal
is to assess the level of security our implementations provide
against other, e.g. higher-order, power analysis attacks.
Since there is no single, all-embracing test to evaluate the
security of an implementation, we test its resistance against
state-of-the-art attacks. We narrow the evaluation to univariate
attacks because our implementations process all shares of a
value in parallel. Estimating the information-theoretic metric
by Standaert et al. [24] is out of reach. It would require
estimation of at least 248 Gaussian templates.
We make several choices that are in favor of an adversary
and make attacks easier. First, to minimize algorithmic noise
the PRNG and the TI AES do not operate in parallel, i.e.
the PRNG generates and stores a sufficient number of random
bits before each TI AES operation. In practice, running them
in parallel will increase the level of noise and thus the number
of measurements needed for an attack to succeed. Second, we
provide the crypto FPGA with a stable 3MHz clock frequency
to ensure that the traces are well aligned and the power peaks
of adjacent clock cycles do not overlap (this would also help
to assign a possibly identified leak to a specific clock cycle).
In practice, clocking the device at a faster or unstable clock
will make attacks harder. Third, we let the adversary know the
implementation. Specifically, if the PRNG was switched off the
adversary would be able to correctly compute bit values and bit
flips under the correct key hypothesis. In practice, obscurity
is often used as an additional layer of security. Fourth, we
use synchronous (over-)sampling [25] to avoid clock drift
and achieve the best possible alignment. In practice, secure
devices use an internal (and unstable) clock source which
prevents synchronous sampling and increases the number of
measurements needed for an attack to succeed.
B. PRNG switched off
To confirm that our setup works correctly and to get some
reference values we first attack the implementations with the
PRNG switched off. We expect that the implementations can
be broken with many first-order attacks. As example, we
applied correlation DPA attacks [26] that use the Hamming
distance of two consecutive S-box outputs as power model.
The attacks require 2 · 28 key hypotheses. To reduce the
computational complexity we let the adversary know one key
byte and aim to recover the second one.
Since the adversary knows the implementation, he can
choose to compute the Hamming distance over three 8-bit
registers (all versions; S33 and P3; output of the S-box in
three shares), two 8-bit registers (raw and nimble; S32; one
cycle later; two shares) or ignore the details and compute
the distance over a single 8-bit register as if it was a plain
implementation. For all versions, only a few hundred traces
are required to recover the key with any of these attacks. It is
worth noting that the highest correlation peaks do not occur
at the S-box output registers, but three resp. two clock cycles
later when the same bit-flips occur in register S30. This register
drives the MixColumns logic and therefore has a much greater
fanout.
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We also applied correlation collision attacks [7] that target
combinational logic. The attacks compute two sets of mean
traces for the values of two processed plaintext bytes and shift
the mean traces in the time domain to align them. They aim
to recover the linear difference between the two key bytes
involved. To do so, they permute one set of mean traces
according to a hypothesis on the linear difference and then
correlate both sets of mean traces. The results show that this
attack is successful with a few thousand measurements for
all versions. For more details and figures regarding the raw
implementation, see [17].
C. PRNG switched on
Next we repeat the evaluation with the PRNG switched on,
i.e. the TI AES uses unknown and unpredictable random bits.
For the DPA attacks using the Hamming distance over two or
three registers as power model, we suppose these bits were
zero.
1) Raw implementation: Fig. 6 shows the results of the
first-order attacks against the protected implementation using
10 million measurements. The results show that the attacks
fail.
Figure 6: Results of first-order DPA and correlation collision
attacks on raw implementation with PRNG on computed using
10 million traces; top, left: HD over 1 register; top, right: HD
over 2 registers; bottom, left: HD over 3 registers; bottom,
right: correlation collision.
We proceed with higher-order attacks to assess the level of
security this implementation provides. For our second-order
DPA attacks we use the same power models as before but
center and then square the traces (for each time sample) before
correlating [2], [27], [28]. Second-order correlation collision
attacks work as above with mean traces replaced by variance
traces [13].
Fig. 7 (top, left) shows the results of the second-order DPA
attack that uses the Hamming distance in a single register
as power model (as if it was a plain implementation) using
10 million measurements. We note that the highest correlation
peak occurs again when the same bitflips happen in register
S30, similar to when the PRNG was switched off. The attack
requires about 600 000 traces to succeed, as shown in Fig. 7
(top, right). Second-order DPA attacks using the Hamming
distance over two resp. three registers as power model failed
to recover the key, presumably because we do not know the
masks’ values and assume they are zero.
Fig. 7 (bottom, left) shows the results of the second-order
correlation collision attack using 10 million measurements.
The attack requires about 3.5 million traces to succeed, as
shown in Fig. 7 (bottom, right).
Figure 7: Results of second-order DPA (top) and correlation
collision (bottom) attacks on raw implementation with PRNG
on computed using 10 million traces; right: min./max. corre-
lation coefficient per hypothesis (from the overall time span)
over number of traces used.
2) Adjusted implementation: We performed the same analy-
sis as on the raw implementation. Fig. 8 shows that neither the
first-order DPA attack that uses the Hamming distance in one
register as power model nor the first-order correlation collision
attack work with 10 million traces, as expected.
Figure 8: Results of first-order DPA (left) and correlation col-
lision (right) attacks on adjusted implementation with PRNG
on computed using 10 million traces.
Unlike our result for the raw implementation, we observe
that second-order DPA does not work even with 10 million
traces as shown in Fig. 9 (top). This result is natural since
the adjusted implementation uses three shares instead of two
in register S33 (and the entire state array). We expect a third-
order DPA attack that exploits the third standardized moment
of the traces to be possible, however the available 10 million
traces were not enough.
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On the other hand, a second-order correlation collision
attack still succeeds, indicating leakage from possible glitches
in the S-box, as shown in Fig. 9 (bottom, left). Recall that
the adjusted implementation uses at least three shares in
every operation. Compared to Fig. 7 (bottom, left) the second
correlation peak does not show. This might be the reason why
the attack becomes harder, as shown in Fig. 9 (bottom, right).
It is successful with about 4 million traces, but the separation
of the correct key from the wrong keys is poor, even using
10 million traces. This observation indicates that the leakage
that leads to the first correlation peak is almost linear and
therefore harder to exploit.
Figure 9: Results of second-order DPA (top) and correlation
collision (bottom) attacks on adjusted implementation with
PRNG on computed using 10 million traces; right: min./max.
correlation coefficient per hypothesis (from the overall time
span) over number of traces used.
3) Nimble implementation: We performed the same analysis
as on the raw implementation and the results are similar. First-
order DPA and correlation collision attacks fail with 10 million
traces. Both second-order DPA and correlation collision attacks
show peaks (Fig. 10, left) in the same clock cycle as for
the raw implementation. They succeed with about 600 000
and 8.5 million traces, respectively, as shown in Fig. 10
(right). However, we observe that the correlation collision
attack requires more traces to be successful than for the raw
implementation. We suspect that this is due to the simpler
component functions of the nimble implementation, which
cause less glitches in the circuit.
D. Discussion
The first goal of our evaluation is to verify our implemen-
tations’ resistance against first-order attacks. But this goal is
always limited by the number of measurements at hand. It is
simply not possible to demonstrate resistance against attacks
with an infinite number of traces. We have shown that our
implementations resist state-of-the-art first-order attacks with
10 million traces in conditions that are strongly in favor of the
adversary (no algorithmic noise from the PRNG, knowledge
of the implementation, slow and stable clock, best possible
Figure 10: Results of second-order DPA (top) and corre-
lation collision (bottom) attacks on nimble implementation
with PRNG on computed using 1 million and 10 million
traces, respectively; right: min./max. correlation coefficient per
hypothesis (from the overall time span) over number of traces
used.
alignment). Given the theoretical foundations of TI and the
correctness of our implementations, we are convinced that our
implementations resist first-order attacks with any number of
measurements, but we have no way to demonstrate that.
The second goal of our evaluation is to assess the level
of security our implementations provide against higher-order
attacks and to relate the results to the area and random-
ness requirements. In the same adversary-friendly conditions,
the most trace-efficient second-order attack in our evaluation
requires about 600 000 traces for the raw and the nimble
implementations. The attack exploits that the state array is in
two shares, which is common to both implementations that
mainly differ in the S-box implementation. Since the nimble
implementation requires less resources and provides a similar
level of security, it is preferable over the raw implementation.
As expected, the adjusted implementation with at least
three shares in all operations provides better security than the
raw implementation it is based on. The same second-order
DPA attack that succeeded with 600 000 traces against the
raw implementation fails against the adjusted implementation
even with 10 million traces. Also a third-order DPA attack
against the adjusted implementation fails with 10 million
measurements. The trace requirement for a successful second-
order correlation collision attack increases only slightly from
3.5 million to about 4 million, but the separation of the
correct key from the wrong keys is much poorer. The price
of this increase in security is a roughly 23% larger circuit
(randomness requirements and timings are identical).
V. CONCLUSION
We discuss three different versions of TIs of AES. We show
that it is possible to achieve first-order DPA resistance with
non-uniform shared functions if re-masking is applied properly.
In the case of AES, our “non-uniform” nimble implementation
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requires less randomness than our “uniform” raw implemen-
tation, due to the decreased number of shares. However, for
other algorithms and other S-boxes, re-masking may increase
the amount of randomness required. This idea can be used
to trade-off between the randomness and area requirements.
Moreover, we empirically confirm that increasing the number
of shares has a significant impact on the performance of
higher-order attacks, which provides another trade-off between
area and DPA resistance. Our most efficient implementation
is approximately 8k GE small and requires only 32 bits of
fresh randomness per S-box calculation, which is a significant
improvement over all previous works.
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APPENDIX
A. Multiplier in GF(24)
(Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4) = (X1, X2, X3, X4) × (X5, X6, X7, X8)
Y1 = X1X5 ⊕X3X5 ⊕X4X5 ⊕X2X6 ⊕X3X6 ⊕X1X7 ⊕X2X7 ⊕X3X7 ⊕X4X7
⊕X1X8 ⊕X3X8
Y2 = X2X5 ⊕X3X5 ⊕X1X6 ⊕X2X6 ⊕X4X6 ⊕X1X7 ⊕X3X7 ⊕X2X8 ⊕X4X8
Y3 = X1X5 ⊕X2X5 ⊕X3X5 ⊕X4X5 ⊕X1X6 ⊕X3X6 ⊕X1X7 ⊕X2X7 ⊕X3X7⊕
X1X8 ⊕X4X8
Y4 = X1X5 ⊕X3X5 ⊕X2X6 ⊕X4X6 ⊕X1X7 ⊕X4X7 ⊕X2X8 ⊕X3X8 ⊕X4X8
B. Inverter in GF(24)
(Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4) = Inv(X1, X2, X3, X4)
Y1 = X3 ⊕X4 ⊕X1X3 ⊕X2X3 ⊕X2X3X4
Y2 = X4 ⊕X1X3 ⊕X2X3 ⊕X2X4 ⊕X1X3X4
Y3 = X1 ⊕X2 ⊕X1X3 ⊕X1X4 ⊕X1X2X4
Y4 = X2 ⊕X1X3 ⊕X1X4 ⊕X2X4 ⊕X1X2X3
C. Sharing with 4 Input 3 Output Shares
F = XY, where
F = F1 ⊕ F2 ⊕ F3
X = X1 ⊕X2 ⊕X3 ⊕X4
Y = Y1 ⊕ Y2 ⊕ Y3 ⊕ Y4
F1 = (X2 ⊕X3 ⊕X4)(Y2 ⊕ Y3) ⊕ Y4
F2 = ((X1 ⊕X3)(Y1 ⊕ Y4)) ⊕X1Y3 ⊕X4
F3 = ((X2 ⊕X4)(Y1 ⊕ Y4)) ⊕X1Y2 ⊕X4 ⊕ Y4
D. Sharing with 3 Input 3 Output Shares
F = XY ⊕ Z, where
F = F1 ⊕ F2 ⊕ F3
X = X1 ⊕X2 ⊕X3
Y = Y1 ⊕ Y2 ⊕ Y3
Z = Z1 ⊕ Z2 ⊕ Z3
F1 = ((X2 ⊕X3)(Y2 ⊕ Y3)) ⊕ Z2
F2 = (X1Y3 ⊕ Y1X3 ⊕X1Y1) ⊕ Z3
F3 = (X1Y2 ⊕ Y1X2) ⊕ Z1
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E. Sharing with 4 Input 4 Output Shares
F = XYZ ⊕XY ⊕ Z, where
F = F1 ⊕ F2 ⊕ F3 ⊕ F4
X = X1 ⊕X2 ⊕X3 ⊕X4
Y = Y1 ⊕ Y2 ⊕ Y3 ⊕ Y4
Z = Z1 ⊕ Z2 ⊕ Z3 ⊕ Z4
F1 = ((X2 ⊕X3 ⊕X4)(Y2 ⊕ Y3 ⊕ Y4)(Z2 ⊕ Z3 ⊕ Z4))
⊕ ((X2 ⊕X3 ⊕X4)(Y2 ⊕ Y3 ⊕ Y4)) ⊕ Z2
F2 = (X1(Y3 ⊕ Y4)(Z3 ⊕ Z4) ⊕ Y1(X3 ⊕X4)(Z3 ⊕ Z4) ⊕ Z1(X3 ⊕X4)(Y3 ⊕ Y4)
⊕X1Y1(Z3 ⊕ Z4) ⊕X1Z1(Y3 ⊕ Y4) ⊕ Y1Z1(X3 ⊕X4) ⊕X1Y1Z1)
⊕ (X1(Y3 ⊕ Y4) ⊕ Y1(X3 ⊕X4) ⊕X1Y1) ⊕ Z3
F3 = (X1Y1Z2 ⊕X1Y2Z1 ⊕X2Y1X1 ⊕X1Y2Z2 ⊕X2Y1Z2 ⊕X2Y2Z1 ⊕X1Y2Z4
⊕X2Y1Z4 ⊕X1Y4Z2 ⊕X2Y4Z1 ⊕X4Y1Z2 ⊕X4Y2Z1) ⊕ (X1Y2 ⊕ Y1X2) ⊕ Z4
F4 = (X1Y2Z3 ⊕X1Y3Z2 ⊕X2Y1Z3 ⊕X2Y3Z1 ⊕X3Y1Z2 ⊕X3Y2Z1) ⊕ 0 ⊕ Z1
F. Sharing with 5 Input 5 Output Shares
F = XYZ ⊕XY ⊕ Z, where
F = F1 ⊕ F2 ⊕ F3 ⊕ F4 ⊕ F5
X = X1 ⊕X2 ⊕X3 ⊕X4 ⊕X5
Y = Y1 ⊕ Y2 ⊕ Y3 ⊕ Y4 ⊕ Y5
Z = Z1 ⊕ Z2 ⊕ Z3 ⊕ Z4 ⊕ Z5
F1 = ((X2 ⊕X3 ⊕X4 ⊕X5)(Y2 ⊕ Y3 ⊕ Y4 ⊕ Y5)(Z2 ⊕ Z3 ⊕ Z4 ⊕ Z5))
⊕ ((X2 ⊕X3 ⊕X4 ⊕X5)(Y2 ⊕ Y3 ⊕ Y4 ⊕ Y5)) ⊕ Z2
F2 = (X1(Y3 ⊕ Y4 ⊕ Y5)(Z3 ⊕ Z4 ⊕ Z5) ⊕ Y1(X3 ⊕X4 ⊕X5)(Z3 ⊕ Z4 ⊕ Z5)
⊕ Z1(X3 ⊕X4 ⊕X5)(Y3 ⊕ Y4 ⊕ Y5) ⊕X1Y1(Z3 ⊕ Z4 ⊕ Z5) ⊕X1Z1(Y3 ⊕ Y4 ⊕ Y5)
⊕ Y1Z1(X3 ⊕X4 ⊕X5) ⊕X1Y1Z1) ⊕ (X1(Y3 ⊕ Y4 ⊕ Y5) ⊕ Y1(X3 ⊕X4 ⊕X5)
⊕X1Y1) ⊕ Z3
F3 = (X1Y1Z2 ⊕X1Y2Z1 ⊕X2Y1X1 ⊕X1Y2Z2 ⊕X2Y1Z2 ⊕X2Y2Z1 ⊕X1Y2Z4
⊕X2Y1Z4 ⊕X1Y4Z2 ⊕X2Y4Z1 ⊕X4Y1Z2 ⊕X4Y2Z1 ⊕X1Y2Z5 ⊕X2Y1Z5
⊕X1Y5Z2 ⊕X2Y5Z1 ⊕X5Y1Z2 ⊕X5Y2Z1) ⊕ (X1Y2 ⊕ Y1X2) ⊕ Z4
F4 = (X1Y2Z3 ⊕X1Y3Z2 ⊕X2Y1Z3 ⊕X2Y3Z1 ⊕X3Y1Z2 ⊕X3Y2Z1) ⊕ 0 ⊕ Z5
F5 = 0 ⊕ 0 ⊕ Z1
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